(18-Crown-6-[kappa]6O)(pyrazolato-[kappa]2N,N')-potassium(I)

The asymmetric unit of the title compound, [K(C3H3N2)(C12H24O6)], is composed of a potassium cation bonded to the six O atoms of a crown ether molecule and the two N atoms of a pyrazolate anion. The K...O distances range from 2.8416 (8) to 3.0025 (8) Å, and the two K...N distances are 2.7441 (11) and 2.7654 (11) Å. The K cation is displaced by 0.8437 (4) Å from the best plane through the six O atoms. The latter plane is almost perpendicular to the plane of the pyrazolate ring [dihedral angle 83.93 (3)°]. Key indicators: single-crystal X-ray study; T = 173 K; mean σ(C–C) = 0.002 A°; R factor = 0.026; wR factor = 0.066; data-to-parameter ratio = 16.5

The Influence of Special Interest Groups on Copyright Law and Policy—A Comparison of the Legislative Processes in the United States and Switzerland

In April 2016, the Office of the United States Trade Representative placed Switzerland on the Watch List of its 2016 Special 301 Report, which contains an annual review of the state of intellectual property rights protection and enforcement in U.S. trading partners around the world. According to the Report, the decision to put Switzerland on the Watch List was premised on U.S. concerns regarding specific difficulties in Switzerland’s system of online copyright protection and enforcement, particularly the “Logistep” ruling issued by the Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland in 2010. Although the Swiss authorities have acknowledged the difficulties mentioned in the Special 301 Report, the fierce criticism raised by the U.S. seems inappropriate, as the Swiss federal legislature decided long ago to remedy the shortcomings in the Swiss Copyright Act and initiated the appropriate legislative procedures in 2012. Due to the nature of Switzerland’s direct democracy, however, the legislative process is still in progress, with the parliament awaiting the results of the public consultation procedure during the course of the year. Despite this clear roadmap, the United States is increasing its pressure on the Swiss government and encourages it to move forward with concrete and effective measures that address copyright piracy in an appropriate and effective manner. Over the same period of time, the most recent legislative proposals in the field of copyright law in the United States have come to an abrupt halt. Unprecedented public outcry against the legislative proposals in 2012 led to the so-called SOPA and PIPA online protests, which resulted in a political deadlock in the field of copyright law and policymaking. In the eyes of several legal scholars, these protests have revealed a lack of democratic legitimacy in the federal legislative process in the United States, as it denies the general public any meaningful form of participation. Focusing on the respective histories of copyright law and policy in the United States and Switzerland, this Article examines how copyright lobbyists and other special interest groups assert their influence in the legislative process, and how their influence can be diminished. Illustrated by the example of copyright legislation, the Article shows that the instruments of direct democracy in Switzerland—which ultimately caused the delays addressed in the Special 301 Report—not only effectively counterbalance the effect of legislative lobbying, but also help to enhance public acceptance of legislative proposals in general. Ultimately, this Article claims that the United States could strengthen the democratic legitimacy of its federal legislative process by implementing a mandatory public consultation procedure based on the model of Switzerland, which might create a first step towards breaking the current standoff in U.S. copyright lawmaking

One Free Swerve? Requiring Police to Corroborate Anonymous Tips in Order to Establish Reasonable Suspicion for Warrantless Seizure of Alleged Drunk Drivers

The Supreme Court holds that warrantless searches and seizures are presumptively unreasonable. Nonetheless, the Court has carved out exceptions that give law enforcement officials considerable flexibility with which to conduct their day-to-day criminal investigations. One such exception to the warrant requirement is that police may stop and question an individual so long as the detaining officer has a reasonable belief that criminal activity may be taking place. Furthermore, the Court permits this requisite reasonable suspicion to be based on information provided by third-party sources, and has identified specific limits as to the type and quality of information police may use. In Florida v. J.L., the Court unanimously recognized such a limit, finding that reasonable suspicion cannot be based exclusively on a bare-boned anonymous tip. Consequently, the Court established an evidentiary baseline for all future police detentions: in order to use third-party information as the basis for a stop or search, police must first ascertain the informant’s reliability by either discovering the tipster’s identity or verifying sufficient predictive information related to the alleged crime. A reasonable suspicion to detain the subject of the tip can only be formed through independent investigation of the alleged criminal activity. Nevertheless, the Court complicated this general rule by hypothesizing that police might be able to act on a lesser showing of reliability when an anonymous tip alleges a sufficiently great danger, but subsequently declined to expound on what circumstances would present such an extreme danger. Consequently, the Court left unanswered what set of facts would warrant using a bare-boned anonymous tip as the sole basis for initiating a seizure and search. In particular, court decisions involving anonymous tips that allege potentially intoxicated motorists, reveal substantial disagreement as to the role these anonymous tips should play in an officer’s decision to initiate a traffic stop. This issue recently gained national attention when the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari to hear Virginia v. Harris. In that case, a Driving Under the Influence (DUI) conviction was overturned because the arresting officer stopped the defendant’s vehicle solely on the basis of an anonymous tip without corroborating suspicious behavior. In an impassioned dissent from the denial of certiorari, Chief Justice Roberts argued that both the frequency and deadliness of drunk driving accidents might justify allowing stops of allegedly intoxicated motorists solely on the basis of a bare anonymous tip, without corroboration of the tip’s criminal allegations. He contended that declining to hear Harris was effectively giving drunk drivers “one free swerve” before police could initiate a stop, inevitably endangering countless lives. Despite the denial of certiorari, this issue is ripe for review and should be heard to conform this divisive issue to the correct interpretation of the law. In order to establish the reasonable suspicion necessary to initiate an investigatory traffic stop, police should be required to corroborate beyond readily observable innocent details of an anonymous tip alleging erratic driving. Considerable Supreme Court precedent related to warrantless seizures implies that police cannot rely solely on an anonymous tip alleging drunk driving if the tip provides no means to establish the informant’s reliability. Moreover, the threat posed by a potentially intoxicated motorist is inconsistent with the extraordinary danger exception suggested in Florida v. J.L. In Part I of his paper, the author examines the historical development of Fourth Amendment case law as it relates to the use of anonymous tips by law enforcement. Part II addresses how these precedents apply in the context of investigatory traffic stops of allegedly intoxicated motorists, and examines the reasoning of jurisdictions on either side of the issue. Part III presents an analysis of the issue and argues that police must corroborate beyond just innocent information provided by an anonymous tip of dangerous driving. Finally, Part IV concludes by recommending that the appropriate focus should be on reducing the anonymity of anonymous reports of erratic driving, rather than constructing exceptions for such tips under the Fourth Amendment. The author also recommends that the Supreme Court should hear this issue to resolve this discrepancy and provide a uniform law consistent with the traditional application of the Fourth Amendment: when law enforcement cannot establish a caller’s credibility, they should be required to take the relatively minor step of corroborating the allegation to ensure there is a reasonable basis for a seizure before initiating an investigatory traffic stop

One Free Swerve? Requiring Police to Corroborate Anonymous Tips in Order to Establish Reasonable Suspicion for Warrantless Seizure of Alleged Drunk Drivers

The Supreme Court holds that warrantless searches and seizures are presumptively unreasonable. Nonetheless, the Court has carved out exceptions that give law enforcement officials considerable flexibility with which to conduct their day-to-day criminal investigations. One such exception to the warrant requirement is that police may stop and question an individual so long as the detaining officer has a reasonable belief that criminal activity may be taking place. Furthermore, the Court permits this requisite reasonable suspicion to be based on information provided by third-party sources, and has identified specific limits as to the type and quality of information police may use. In Florida v. J.L., the Court unanimously recognized such a limit, finding that reasonable suspicion cannot be based exclusively on a bare-boned anonymous tip. Consequently, the Court established an evidentiary baseline for all future police detentions: in order to use third-party information as the basis for a stop or search, police must first ascertain the informant’s reliability by either discovering the tipster’s identity or verifying sufficient predictive information related to the alleged crime. A reasonable suspicion to detain the subject of the tip can only be formed through independent investigation of the alleged criminal activity. Nevertheless, the Court complicated this general rule by hypothesizing that police might be able to act on a lesser showing of reliability when an anonymous tip alleges a sufficiently great danger, but subsequently declined to expound on what circumstances would present such an extreme danger. Consequently, the Court left unanswered what set of facts would warrant using a bare-boned anonymous tip as the sole basis for initiating a seizure and search. In particular, court decisions involving anonymous tips that allege potentially intoxicated motorists, reveal substantial disagreement as to the role these anonymous tips should play in an officer’s decision to initiate a traffic stop. This issue recently gained national attention when the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari to hear Virginia v. Harris. In that case, a Driving Under the Influence (DUI) conviction was overturned because the arresting officer stopped the defendant’s vehicle solely on the basis of an anonymous tip without corroborating suspicious behavior. In an impassioned dissent from the denial of certiorari, Chief Justice Roberts argued that both the frequency and deadliness of drunk driving accidents might justify allowing stops of allegedly intoxicated motorists solely on the basis of a bare anonymous tip, without corroboration of the tip’s criminal allegations. He contended that declining to hear Harris was effectively giving drunk drivers “one free swerve” before police could initiate a stop, inevitably endangering countless lives. Despite the denial of certiorari, this issue is ripe for review and should be heard to conform this divisive issue to the correct interpretation of the law. In order to establish the reasonable suspicion necessary to initiate an investigatory traffic stop, police should be required to corroborate beyond readily observable innocent details of an anonymous tip alleging erratic driving. Considerable Supreme Court precedent related to warrantless seizures implies that police cannot rely solely on an anonymous tip alleging drunk driving if the tip provides no means to establish the informant’s reliability. Moreover, the threat posed by a potentially intoxicated motorist is inconsistent with the extraordinary danger exception suggested in Florida v. J.L. In Part I of his paper, the author examines the historical development of Fourth Amendment case law as it relates to the use of anonymous tips by law enforcement. Part II addresses how these precedents apply in the context of investigatory traffic stops of allegedly intoxicated motorists, and examines the reasoning of jurisdictions on either side of the issue. Part III presents an analysis of the issue and argues that police must corroborate beyond just innocent information provided by an anonymous tip of dangerous driving. Finally, Part IV concludes by recommending that the appropriate focus should be on reducing the anonymity of anonymous reports of erratic driving, rather than constructing exceptions for such tips under the Fourth Amendment. The author also recommends that the Supreme Court should hear this issue to resolve this discrepancy and provide a uniform law consistent with the traditional application of the Fourth Amendment: when law enforcement cannot establish a caller’s credibility, they should be required to take the relatively minor step of corroborating the allegation to ensure there is a reasonable basis for a seizure before initiating an investigatory traffic stop

Constraints on Transport Models for Galactic Cosmic Rays and their Implications for the Anomalous Positron Abundance

While supernova remnants account for most of the cosmic rays in the Galaxy, they do not produce essential amounts of antimatter. The predicted amount of positrons, which are assumed to be purely secondary produced by cosmic ray interactions, cannot explain the measurements from PAMELA and very recently from AMS-02. In this work current cosmic ray transport models are investigated and the transport related uncertainty on the expected secondary positron flux is quantified

Sphalerons, Antisphalerons and Vortex Rings

We present new classical solutions of Weinberg-Salam theory in the limit of vanishing Weinberg angle. In these static axially symmetric solutions, the Higgs field vanishes either on isolated points on the symmetry axis, or on rings centered around the symmetry axis. The solutions represent systems of sphalerons, antisphalerons, and vortex rings.Comment: 8 pages, 3 figures, minor corrections include

Spatiotemporal variability of lightning activity in Europe and the relation to the North Atlantic Oscillation teleconnection pattern

Comprehensive lightning statistics are presented for a large, contiguous domain covering several European countries such as France, Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. Spatiotemporal variability of convective activity is investigated based on a 14-year time series (2001–2014) of lightning data. Based on the binary variable thunderstorm day, the mean spatial patterns of lightning activity and regional peculiarities regarding seasonality are discussed. Diurnal cycles are compared among several regions and evaluated with respect to major seasonal changes. Further analyses are performed regarding interannual variability and the impact of teleconnection patterns on convection. Mean convective activity across central Europe is characterized by a strong northwest-to-southeast gradient with pronounced secondary features superimposed. The zone of maximum values of thunderstorm days propagates southwestward along the southern Alpine range from April to July. Diurnal cycles vary substantially between both different months and regions, particularly regarding the incidence of nighttime lightning. The North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO) is shown to have a significant impact on convective activity in several regions, which is primarily caused by variations of the large-scale lifting pattern in both NAO phases. This dynamical effect is partly compensated for by thermodynamical modifications of the pre-convective environment. The results point to a crucial role of large-scale flow in steering the spatiotemporal patterns of convective activity